Quantum Money & Unclonable Cryptography
From Wiesner's banknotes to modern unclonable primitives.
Around 1970, Stephen Wiesner proposed banknotes that physics, not paper, makes unforgeable. His paper went unpublished until 1983, by which time it had also seeded quantum key distribution. Today quantum money is the gateway to a whole field: cryptography built on the impossibility of copying.
What you’ll learn
- Define private-key quantum money, its completeness and soundness conditions, and Wiesner's construction.
- Prove that simple counterfeiting of Wiesner money succeeds with probability exactly , via a semidefinite program and its dual.
- Explain adaptive attacks that exploit the bank's verification, and how a bank must respond.
- Explain why public-key money needs computational assumptions, and analyze the Aaronson–Christiano hidden-subspace verifier.
- Survey unclonable cryptographic primitives and their main open problems.
Wiesner's banknotes
The bank mints a note with a public serial number and qubits, each prepared independently and uniformly in one of the four BB84 states . It records the classical description (basis and bit of every qubit) under in a secret database. To verify, the bank measures each qubit in its recorded basis and accepts if every bit matches. An honest note always passes.
The counterfeiter seems stuck: the four states include non-orthogonal pairs, so by no-cloning no device copies them all, and measuring in the wrong basis randomizes the bit. But "cannot copy perfectly" is not a number. How well can she do?
| Attack on each qubit | Both notes pass | For |
|---|---|---|
| Keep the original; make the copy | ||
| Measure in , prepare two copies of the result | ||
| Universal (Bužek–Hillery) cloner | ||
| Optimal attack |
The counterfeiter measures one qubit of the note in the basis and prepares two qubits in the state she saw. What is the probability that both qubits pass the bank's check?
Show the answer
0.625
With probability ½ the qubit is or : she reads it perfectly and both copies pass. With probability ½ it is : her outcome is random, and each copy independently passes the check with probability ½, so both pass with probability ¼. Total: .
The optimal counterfeiter: exactly 3/4 per qubit
One qubit first. The counterfeiter applies a channel from one qubit to two; success means both outputs pass the test .
Encode by its Choi matrix , so that ; the BB84 states are real, so . Complete positivity means , trace preservation means .
Weak duality: every such certifies an upper bound.
The nonzero spectrum of is that of the Gram matrix , whose off-diagonal entries are or . It equals , where has eigenvalues . Hence .
A feasible dual point gives the upper bound.
(Input qubit first.) Both vectors lie in the -eigenspace of , and . So : the bound is attained. This attack passes with probability exactly on each of the four states.
For qubits the objective is . The dual point stays feasible because , and its value is ; the product attack attains it. Entangling the qubits cannot help.
Think first Think first: if the bank drew each qubit from all six states , would the optimal per-qubit counterfeiting probability go up or down?
Down, to . The success probability is linear in , a third moment, and the six states form a 3-design, so the average equals the Haar average. Against a Haar-random state the best attack is the optimal universal cloner, with global fidelity ; and the same dual certificate, now with , proves nothing does better.
Why does the bound hold even against counterfeiters who apply one big entangling operation to all qubits?
- The bank measures the qubits one at a time, which destroys any entanglement
- The dual certificate remains feasible for the -qubit program, whose objective is
- Entangling operations cannot be applied to banknotes in practice
- It does not: entangled attacks achieve
Show the answer
B. The dual certificate remains feasible for the -qubit program, whose objective is
The -qubit SDP optimizes over all channels, entangling ones included. Since , its value bounds every attack: here the SDP value is multiplicative.
When the bank talks back: adaptive attacks
A simple counterfeiter never talks to the bank again. Real banks verify notes on demand, and that changes everything. If the bank returns a note after a successful verification, rather than issuing a fresh one, every verification is a measurement the attacker can exploit, and Wiesner's scheme can be broken (Lutomirski 2010; Nagaj, Sattath, Brodutch & Unruh 2016).
Public-key money and hidden subspaces
In Wiesner's scheme only the bank can verify. Public-key money lets anyone verify with a public procedure, while only the mint can create notes. This can never be secure against unbounded adversaries: given the public verification circuit, an exponential-time adversary can compute a description of a state it accepts and then prepare that state as often as it likes (Aaronson 2009). Public-key money therefore needs computational assumptions, with no-cloning-style arguments combined with hardness.
The Hadamard transform over .
Write . For every sign is , so each such gets amplitude . The amplitude is the same for all values of , which makes the result times the normalized state .
Because . So the test accepts with probability exactly , and a valid note passes undisturbed: two membership queries implement the ideal projective test onto the note.
Security. With the membership tests as black-box oracles, Aaronson and Christiano proved that any counterfeiter who turns one note into two must make exponentially many queries, using an inner-product variant of the quantum adversary method. The hard part is the real world, where the oracles must be replaced by code. Their concrete proposal hid in random low-degree polynomials; that instantiation was broken by algebraic attacks, at least in its noise-free form (Pena, Faugère & Perret 2015). Zhandry (2019) later showed that hiding the subspaces with indistinguishability obfuscation yields a secure scheme, assuming post-quantum obfuscation of that kind exists.
Unclonable cryptography
Money is the first of many primitives whose security comes from no-cloning, usually combined with computational assumptions.
| Primitive | Guarantee | Status (mid-2020s) |
|---|---|---|
| Private-key money (Wiesner 1983) | Only the bank can mint, and the bank verifies | Unconditionally secure against simple counterfeiting; adaptive security needs care |
| Public-key money (Aaronson 2009; Aaronson–Christiano 2012) | Anyone verifies; only the mint creates | Candidates from obfuscation, knots and other structures; a construction from standard assumptions such as LWE is open |
| Quantum lightning (Zhandry 2019) | Even the mint cannot make two notes with the same serial number | Candidates only; open from standard assumptions |
| Copy-protection (Aaronson 2009) | A program state that computes but cannot be split into two working copies | Impossible for general functions (Ananth & La Placa 2021); possible for some classes, under strong assumptions or with oracles |
| Unclonable encryption (Broadbent & Lord 2020) | A ciphertext that two parties cannot both decrypt once the key is revealed | Weaker "search" security via monogamy-of-entanglement games; the strongest indistinguishability notion is an active research question |
| Certified deletion (Broadbent & Islam 2020) | The receiver can prove that the plaintext was destroyed | Constructions exist, some information-theoretically secure |
| One-shot signatures (Amos, Georgiou, Kiayias & Zhandry 2020) | A quantum secret key that can sign exactly one message | Constructed relative to a classical oracle; standard-model constructions are an active topic |
Key takeaways
- Wiesner money: BB84 states with secret bases. Simple counterfeiting succeeds with probability exactly , certified by a product dual solution of an SDP.
- Security definitions matter: a bank that hands verified notes back enables adaptive bomb-tester attacks.
- Public-key money is impossible information-theoretically. Hidden-subspace money verifies with and is secure relative to oracles; real instantiations hinge on obfuscation.
- No-cloning underlies a growing family of primitives (lightning, copy-protection, unclonable encryption, certified deletion, one-shot signatures), many still open from standard assumptions.
Check yourself
In the interactive lesson these are scored with your confidence, and what you miss comes back for review.
What is the optimal success probability of a simple counterfeiting attack on a 30-qubit Wiesner note?
Show the answer
C.
By the Molina–Vidick–Watrous theorem it is , attained by a product attack.
Why can't public-key quantum money be secure against computationally unbounded counterfeiters?
- No-cloning holds only against efficient adversaries
- Public verification necessarily destroys the note
- The bank would have to be online for every transaction
- From the public verifier, an unbounded adversary can compute a description of an accepted state and prepare it as often as it likes
Show the answer
D. From the public verifier, an unbounded adversary can compute a description of an accepted state and prepare it as often as it likes
The verifier is public, so its accepting subspace can be computed classically (in exponential time). Knowing a state in it, the adversary needs no copying at all. Security must therefore rest on computational hardness.
The Aaronson–Christiano verifier applies , then , then , then . For an arbitrary state , the acceptance probability is:
- for every state supported on
Show the answer
B.
The composition equals the rank-one projector , so the acceptance probability is .
In the bomb-tester attack on Wiesner money, what role does the bank's verification play?
- It is the "bomb": a repeated measurement whose collapses (a Zeno effect) stop the probe from rotating unless the money qubit is unaffected by the CNOT
- It supplies fresh copies of the note
- It amplifies the probe's rotation
- It reveals the bases directly whenever a note fails
Show the answer
A. It is the "bomb": a repeated measurement whose collapses (a Zeno effect) stop the probe from rotating unless the money qubit is unaffected by the CNOT
For or the CNOT entangles probe and note, and each verification collapses the probe back to . Only for , which the CNOT leaves unchanged, does the rotation accumulate. The attacker learns the state while verification failures stay at probability .
Further reading
- S. Wiesner, "Conjugate coding", ACM SIGACT News 15(1), 78 (1983).
- A. Molina, T. Vidick & J. Watrous, "Optimal counterfeiting attacks and generalizations for Wiesner's quantum money", TQC 2012, LNCS (2013).
- S. Aaronson, "Quantum copy-protection and quantum money", Proceedings of the 24th IEEE Conference on Computational Complexity (2009).
- S. Aaronson & P. Christiano, "Quantum money from hidden subspaces", Proceedings of STOC 2012 (2012).
- D. Nagaj, O. Sattath, A. Brodutch & D. Unruh, "An adaptive attack on Wiesner's quantum money", Quantum Information & Computation 16 (2016).